Case 006 · Incident: 11 Oct 2026
French supermarkets: Hackers heated their fridges to 50°C overnight
On the night of October 11, 2026, attackers took remote control of Danfoss refrigeration system controllers at hundreds of French supermarkets, including stores of Intermarché/Netto, Coopérative U, Carrefour, Monoprix and E.Leclerc. They forced fridges and freezers into defrost, and temperatures reached as high as 50°C. Food spoiled and, in some stores, equipment caught fire.
The night the fridges warmed
On the night of October 11, 2026, attackers took remote control of fridges and freezers in hundreds of French supermarkets and warmed them. The owner of Intermarché said its units were forced into defrost and heated to as much as 50 degrees Celsius.[1] When staff arrived on Monday morning, they found warm display cases and spoiled stock. In some stores, equipment had started to catch fire.[1][2] BleepingComputer named Intermarché, Coopérative U, Carrefour Market, Monoprix, Leclerc and Super U among the victims. The European Union's agriculture and food commissioner, Christophe Hansen, condemned the attack and named Leclerc as one of them.[3]
How many stores were hit is disputed. French outlets reported 250 to 350, NBC News at least 350, Ars Technica an estimated 700, and The Hacker News over 700.[3][4][5][6] This episode takes the attack apart link by link: what happened, what the evidence shows, and which control could have broken the chain. There are five links. First, a way in that is still unknown. Second, a foothold on the store's refrigeration controller. Third, spread across hundreds of stores. Fourth, the objective: forced defrost, with alarms reportedly delayed. Fifth, the damage found on Monday.[1][2][3]
Link one: the way in
The first link is the least understood. Neither French authorities nor Danfoss has said how the attackers got in. As of October 13, CERT-FR, the French government's computer emergency response team, had named no vulnerability, no firmware version and no way in.[1] The Hacker News reported where the attackers landed: the controller that runs all of a store's fridges and freezers. It is made by Danish company Danfoss, and maintenance firms can manage it remotely.[1] Remote management can mean public exposure. On the Monday after the attack, Baptiste Robert of Predicta Lab found 2752 Danfoss systems exposed online, 1590 of them in France. A scan the next day reported a different number.[3][4]
On Tuesday, Reuters used the scanning service Shodan and found at least 4,500 Danfoss interfaces still visible. The French firm Onyphe said only a small minority appeared to run the latest software.[4] Most units hit were old models that no longer get security updates, Danfoss said: the AK-SM 800, declared end-of-life in May 2021, and the AK-SC 355, phased out in 2016.[1] These older models had a published weakness. In May 2023, French security firm Synacktiv described a login bypass in the Danfoss SM800 and the SC255 and SC355 system managers. Danfoss said it only affects end-of-life products, so no fix was issued. No link between that advisory and this attack has been established.[1][2]
Some units of the current model, the AK-SM 800A, were hit too. According to Danfoss, they were running outdated firmware. In 2025, CISA warned of an authentication bypass in that hardware platform, and of a command injection flaw, which lets outside input run as commands.[1][3] The bypass was a hidden code-of-the-day login, accepting a password generated from the device's current date. Danfoss fixed three AK-SM 800A flaws in 2025, but neither Danfoss nor French authorities has linked them to this attack.[1][2] Another lead is unconfirmed. A person close to Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu said ANSSI, France's National Cybersecurity Agency, had identified a vulnerability in a Danish company's software. That statement does not say it was used here.[1][4]
Researcher Kevin Beaumont summed up the exposure in a few words.[6] Which control breaks this link? CERT-FR's alert, published in French and reported in English by The Hacker News, says exposing a management interface to the internet goes against good practice. Pen Test Partners said taking controllers off the public internet, with remote access behind a virtual private network and an address allowlist, would have prevented the access.[1][2][6]
Link two: the foothold
The second link is the foothold. One controller runs every fridge and freezer in a store, so whoever holds it holds the cold chain, the unbroken refrigeration that keeps food safe.[1] These boxes sit with third parties. Coopérative U's stores get their Danfoss systems from refrigeration contractors, not from Danfoss. Intermarché pointed to a cyberattack reportedly affecting a service provider that manages store refrigeration.[1][3] E.Leclerc said a cyberattack had affected one of its refrigeration equipment suppliers. Neither E.Leclerc nor Intermarché named that supplier, and it is not known whether the attackers used a contractor's access or reached the controllers directly.[1][3]
For the oldest units, there is no patch. Danfoss issues no fixes for the AK-SM 800 and AK-SC 355, and in October 2025 it urged customers to plan replacements.[1] Danfoss says it advised customers to keep supported systems updated and migrate legacy ones. That is the control at this link: supported hardware, kept current.[4] The warning signs were not new. According to Danfoss, AK-SM 800 systems at 16 Russian supermarkets were targeted in 2022, and 40 Israeli stores were hacked the same year.[1]
Link three: the spread
The third link is spread. In a single night, hundreds of supermarkets across several chains were hit.[1][3] Beaumont called the access easily scriptable, meaning it could be automated across many devices. How the attackers actually reached so many stores has not been disclosed.[1][6] Coopérative U alone counted 80 affected stores out of a group total of 2,000, according to its chief executive, Dominique Schelcher.[4]
The equipment list grew. French media reported that an October 13 update to CERT-FR's alert added Copeland and Dixell XWEB controllers, after a Dixell-equipped E.Leclerc store in the Tarn lost its cold chain.[1][2] Ars Technica reported that all three controller models reportedly hacked, sold by Danfoss and by Dixell and its parent company Copeland, had known critical vulnerabilities. That count does not neatly match Danfoss's own account. Danfoss named three of its own models among the units hit: the AK-SM 800, the AK-SC 355 and the AK-SM 800A.[1][5] It may reach beyond France. Sekoia analyst Félix Aimé told Reuters that Spain, Portugal, Poland, Germany and Belgium were also affected, though Reuters gave no details. ANSSI is in contact with other European agencies.[1]
The control here is fewer reachable doors. ANSSI's head, Vincent Strubel, called it urgent to take both controller series off the internet or filter access very tightly. And according to The Hacker News, the CERT-FR alert calls limiting access to trusted addresses only a first, temporary step.[1]
Link four: the objective
The fourth link is the objective. BleepingComputer reported that the attackers raised fridge temperatures by triggering the controllers' built-in automatic defrost function. In other words, they reportedly used a routine the equipment already had.[3] Les Mousquetaires, which owns Intermarché, said its fridges and freezers were heated to as much as 50 degrees Celsius. The Hacker News reported temperatures that high for roughly six hours.[1][6] Le Monde, as reported by TIME, said the attackers also stretched some defrost cycles from one hour to eight, to delay the alarms that would normally alert staff. That aim comes from a press report, not from an official finding.[2]
The damage came to light when staff arrived on Monday morning. They found warm display cases and spoiled stock.[1][2] The motive is unknown. As of October 13, no group had claimed responsibility and no ransom demand had been reported.[2] Ken Munro of Pen Test Partners offered a guess. NBC News paraphrased him as saying that because the flaws were well known, the attackers were essentially pushing at an open door, and that it could easily be kids messing around. That is speculation, and it is unconfirmed. No known flaw has been linked to this attack, and who did it is still unknown.[1][4]
Link five: the damage
The fifth link is impact. By the time the mass compromise was discovered, food was spoiled, and in some cases electrical systems had caught fire.[5] Outcomes varied. Schelcher said the cold chain held in most of Coopérative U's 80 hit stores, with only a minority losing goods. Intermarché said its affected stores threw away all the products concerned.[1] Schelcher estimated losses of several tens of thousands of euros for a smaller store, and up to €200,000 for a big hypermarket. Intermarché's chief executive, Thierry Cotillard, spoke of tens of millions of euros nationwide in a single day.[4]
Schelcher's verdict was blunt.[3] On October 12, CERT-FR said in an alert published in French that it was aware of numerous compromises of Danfoss AK-SM and AK-SC controllers. Danfoss told Reuters it was aware of incidents in France affecting a limited number of refrigeration management systems.[1][2] The Paris prosecutor's office opened an inquiry on its own initiative, assigned to the anti-cybercrime office, OFAC. It aims to identify the victims and link the attack to the food losses and fires.[1][3]
As of October 13, CERT-FR had published no indicators of compromise, the traces operators can check for. Its remediation starts with cutting off exposed access and includes a factory reset, current fixes and full reconfiguration.[1][2] The core questions stay open: the entry route, whether any known flaw was used, who did it and why, and how many stores were really hit.[1][2][3][5]
Breaking the chain
The entry route is unknown, but most defenses do not depend on it. Some researchers described the controllers as exposed and easy to log in to, and the defrost function the attackers triggered was already built in. How the attackers got in is still unknown. But taking these controllers off the internet, or filtering access very tightly, is something defenders can do now.[1][3][6]
What to do
- Start with an inventory. List every building and refrigeration controller, its model, its firmware version, who maintains it, and whether the maker still supports it.
- Take management interfaces off the public internet. If remote maintenance is unavoidable, route it through a virtual private network with multi-factor sign-in, limited to known addresses.
- Treat contractors as part of your network. Know which firms have remote access, give each technician a named account you can revoke, and review that access regularly.
- Replace controllers the vendor no longer supports. Until you can, isolate them on their own network segment, with no inbound connections from the internet, and keep supported units on current firmware.
- Add a temperature alarm that does not depend on the controller, such as a standalone sensor that alerts staff directly. Alert on unexpected changes to defrost schedules or temperature setpoints, not only on high temperatures.
- If you suspect a compromise, cut external access first, then follow vendor and national agency recovery guidance: reset, patch, and fully reconfigure.
Open questions
- How did the attackers get in? CERT-FR and Danfoss have named no vulnerability, firmware version or entry route.
- Was the vulnerability ANSSI identified, or any of CVE-2025-41450/41451/41452 or the 2023 Synacktiv bypass, actually used in the attack?
- Who carried out the attack, and why? No group has claimed it and no ransom demand has been reported.
- How many stores were affected? Figures conflict: 250-350 (French outlets), at least 350 (Reuters), and 700 or more (Ars Technica, The Hacker News).
- What were the total losses across the industry? Only chain-level estimates exist (e.g. 'tens of millions of euros').
- Danfoss gave no figure for how many systems were hit, and its advisories page listed nothing about the attack as of October 13.
- Were stores in Spain, Portugal, Poland, Germany and Belgium actually hit? Reuters gave no details on those cases.
- How many of the exposed internet-facing Danfoss interfaces are running vulnerable firmware?
- Was the AK-SM 800A 5.3.x software package released in response to the attack?
- Which third-party refrigeration service providers or contractors were compromised? The suppliers have not been named.
- Are the US military commissary freezer defrost outages, or the Ahold Delhaize incident, linked? Neither has a confirmed link.
- Sources disagree on when Claroty published its research: D7 says Aug. 9, D9 says August 2026, while D5 and D6 describe the research alongside the 2025 advisories.