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Case 015 · Incident: since 2024

Android TV box botnet: Your cheap Android TV box may have shipped with a backdoor

In late October 2026, Google led a takedown with Japan's National Police Agency, Lumen, HUMAN Security, Plume, Synthient and TrendAI. It disrupted XCPE (x.cpe), a botnet of more than 1.3 million Android devices, most of them TV set-top boxes. Google says with high confidence that Shenzhen-based maker Videostrong Technology deliberately built the backdoor into device firmware and sold access to criminal affiliates.

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Who was hit, and how badly?

The box looked ordinary on the shelf. But the spyware was already inside it, written into the firmware at the factory, before anyone bought it.[1] In late October 2026, a takedown led by Google cut more than 1.3 million Android devices off from their servers. Most were television set-top boxes.[2] The backdoor did not stay in living rooms. It also turned up on telehealth devices, karaoke machines and digital signage.[2]

Researchers at Synthient found it after buying a MECOOL television box in late 2025 and discovering the malware already preinstalled.[1] Trend Micro's business unit, TrendAI, counted 1,472,554 infected devices across 206 models in four months, and says the true number is at least that high.[2] The counts do not agree. Synthient estimated that only about 500,000 compromised devices were online at the same time. Yet its founder, Ben Brundage, called the 1.3 million figure highly conservative.[3][4]

The infections clustered in Malaysia, Brazil, Iraq, Mexico and Taiwan.[2][5] Even the reach is unsettled. One account puts it at more than 170 countries, another at more than 200.[5][6] By TrendAI's count, the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada each had roughly 26,000 to 42,000 infected devices. CyberScoop reported a higher figure for the United States alone: nearly 44,000 between June and October.[2][5]

The strangest part is not how the malware spread. It is who put it there: the device maker itself, Google says, and we will come to how sure it is.[1]

How did they get in?

Most botnets break in through a software bug or by tricking someone into installing an app. XCPE did neither. It was built into the firmware, the device's core software, during manufacturing.[1] Google's Threat Intelligence Group assesses, with high confidence, that the backdoor was built, deployed and run for profit by its maker.[1] That maker is Videostrong, based in Shenzhen. It builds Android TV boxes under its own name and for other brands, and says it has been an original equipment manufacturer for more than 14 years.[2][6]

Google says Videostrong used obfuscation, which means disguising code so it is hard to inspect, to slip through a gap in Google's certification tests. The malicious code loaded only after the device's first boot.[7] The core component, tracked as x.cpe, ran with Android system-level privileges, the highest level of trust on the device.[1] On start-up, an infected device phoned a control server to collect credentials for a message broker, then used that broker to receive its orders.[1]

That broker let the operators send commands and push more malware onto infected devices.[1] To install software silently, the backdoor first switched off the app checks in Google Play Protect, Android's built-in security feature.[2] With that done, operators could install hidden apps, run commands, capture the screen, and map the home or office network the box sat on.[2]

Google watched them do it live: screenshots, keystrokes, copied account details and system logs, and reverse shells, which are hands-on remote control.[2] The money came from selling access. Videostrong rented the backdoor to criminal affiliates and loaded their modules onto the boxes.[4] Among the affiliate modules were residential proxies. That means routing other people's internet traffic through your TV box, so it looks like it comes from an ordinary home. The modules were tied to a string of proxy brands, including Linkfog, Honeygain, GaGaNode, NetNut and Traffmonetizer.[1][4]

A single infected box could carry as many as three of these proxy toolkits at once.[8] One of them, tied to Honeygain, marked the user as having agreed, without ever showing a consent screen.[8] Other modules ran ad fraud: faking advert views, loading hidden webpages, and clicking adverts no human saw.[1]

Some installed still more backdoors, named Moyu, Spirit and Bird. Moyu added clipboard hijacking and its own proxy trojan on top.[1][8] This did not stay still. From late 2024 the malware grew from a simple dropper into a modular, three-stage system built to serve several paying customers at once.[1][6] From August 2026, the separate loader that ran those modules was replaced by smaller droppers disguised as Android system apps. They used a privilege escalation exploit to write into the protected system partition, making them harder to remove.[1][9]

What still is not known?

How can anyone be sure the maker did this, and not some rogue supplier upstream? The evidence piled up.[1] An open folder on the malware's own server held a document by Videostrong's research and development director. The company's own domain pointed to the same server address as the botnet's controller.[1] Company email addresses had signed the backdoors. One of the code accounts hosting the botnet's packages was named yf-videostrong.[1][2]

The backdoor even fed settings to Videostrong's own streaming app. Plume found the firm supplied both the firmware and the tools to manage these devices remotely.[2] Plume counted more than a dozen device types talking to the control server, most of them MECOOL boxes. KrebsOnSecurity, citing Synthient, reports that MECOOL boxes are sold by Skyworth Technology, a publicly traded Chinese company. Whether Skyworth knew about the backdoor is not known.[2][4] What Google would not say is when, or how, it first learned that a vendor it had approved was running a botnet. Google's Charley Snyder declined to say.[5]

Nor does Google's report say how many certified devices were caught up. Plume says the botnet held both certified and open-source Android devices.[2] Synthient published a list of 182 device model names seen in the campaign, while warning that a model name alone does not prove a box is infected.[2] TrendAI notes the backdoor is signed with the maker's own key, so cleaning it needs vendor action, platform protection, or a new device.[2]

Synthient's advice to consumers is blunt: throw the boxes away for good, because the malware risk is too high. Videostrong did not respond to requests for comment, and MECOOL, unconfirmed, has been rumoured to be shutting down.[2][6][10]

Autopsy Verdict

In Google's own account, the weak point was its own certification testing.[7] Google's answer: deeper firmware checks it will not detail, a legal takedown of the control domains it says rendered the malware benign, and a ban on Videostrong from certified Android.[1][2][6] Taking down the affiliates' control domains may also have cut off criminal access to another 10 million compromised devices, many of them not Android, Google says. That is on top of the more than 1.3 million devices in the botnet itself.[2][6]

But the backdoor was never removed: if deleted, it reinstalls itself from the device's O-E-M partition, a storage area set aside by the manufacturer. Whether a factory reset clears it, and who will tell the owners, is still unanswered.[1][2] Google warns that backdoor makers, ad-fraud rings and proxy sellers work as one supply chain. When one part is disrupted, they quickly switch to new loaders or rival toolkits.[7]

What to do

  • If you run smart devices, treat the cheap ones as untrusted. Keep them on a separate network from anything sensitive, and treat home gadgets on remote workers' networks as part of your attack surface.

Open questions

  • When and how did Google first learn that Videostrong was running the botnet? Google declined to say.
  • How many of the infected devices were Google-certified rather than AOSP builds? Google's report doesn't say.
  • How big is the botnet really? Sources give 1.3M+, TrendAI's 1,472,554 and Synthient's ~500,000 online at once, and Synthient calls 1.3M highly conservative.
  • How many countries were affected? Reports say both more than 200 and more than 170.
  • How many US devices were infected? One source says 26,000–42,000, another nearly 44,000.
  • Does a factory reset remove x.cpe? Plume doesn't say, and the backdoor reinstalls from the /oem/ partition.
  • Will owners be notified, or will anyone push a fix or forced removal? Google didn't explain.
  • Could other criminals reuse the backdoor still left on devices? Malwarebytes warns they could; Google calls it benign now that the domains are severed.
  • What exactly did Google change in its certification review? Google won't share details.
  • How did Videostrong and the affiliated proxy providers (e.g. Oxylabs/Honeygain) respond? Neither commented.
  • Did Skyworth know about the backdoor in its MECOOL boxes?
  • How much money did the operation make? No source gives a figure.

Sources

  1. [1]BleepingComputer — Google disrupts million-device XCPE Android malware botnet, bans TV box maker
  2. [2]The Hacker News — Google Disrupts 1.3 Million-Device Android Botnet, Says TV Box Maker Sold Criminal Access
  3. [3]CyberInsider
  4. [4]KrebsOnSecurity — Tech Firms Dismantle Botnet That Turned 1.3M TV Boxes Into Proxies
  5. [5]CyberScoop
  6. [6]The Record — Google dismantles massive botnet hidden in Android TV boxes
  7. [7]SecurityWeek — Google Dismantles XCPE Botnet of 1.3 Million Android Devices
  8. [8]Technobezz
  9. [9]Help Net Security
  10. [10]9to5Google