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Case 019 · Incident: 20 Aug–23 Sep 2026

Trezor wallets sold online had a hidden spy board inside

Trezor confirmed that three Trezor Safe 5 hardware wallets sold by the Southeast Asian reseller CryptoBilis had a hidden extra circuit board. The board reads the recovery phrase off the screen and sends it over a mobile network to a server run by the attackers. The first case was reported on October 28, 2026 by a customer in Indonesia, after Ledger had already confirmed similar LTE/eSIM implants in its own devices sold by the same reseller.

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The Board Behind the Screen

A customer in Indonesia found an extra circuit board hidden inside his Trezor Safe 5 hardware wallet.[1][2][3] It sat behind the screen, built to read the wallet's recovery phrase straight off the display.[1] Then it sent that phrase over the mobile network to the attackers' server.[1][3]

This customer got lucky: he had already moved his funds off the device before he found it.[3] By mid-November, Trezor had confirmed three implanted Safe 5 wallets, all sold by one reseller, CryptoBilis.[1] No buyer has reported losing money. But Trezor cannot see balances, so nobody can be sure.[1][3]

Some questions are still open. Who fitted these boards, and where? And did any Trezor buyer lose money? Trezor says it does not know.[1][3]

October 9: The First Signal

The first signal came weeks earlier, from Trezor's rival Ledger, on October 9, 2026.[3][4] Ledger said attackers had fitted genuine Ledger devices with hidden components, then drained wallets in a single coordinated operation.[1] Every confirmed loss involved devices sold through one reseller, CryptoBilis.[4]

Cointelegraph reported it was listed as an authorized Ledger reseller in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines.[5] It was also an official Trezor reseller. Trezor removed it that same day and began checking customer devices.[3] Ledger's Donjon team found that a microcontroller, a tiny on-board computer, decoded the 24 recovery words on screen.[4]

It sent them over LTE, the mobile data network, using an eSIM, a built-in digital SIM card.[4] How much was stolen is disputed. Researcher tanuki42 tied eight addresses to more than $72 million, an unconfirmed estimate.[5] Other analysts counted higher, up to $103.4 million across 530 addresses, according to YFarmX.[4]

Ledger says it has not fully verified any of these third-party figures.[4]

August to September: The Intrusion

By then, three Trezor buyers already held compromised wallets, bought from CryptoBilis between August 20 and September 23, 2026.[3][6] Why that matters: a recovery phrase is the wallet's backup, words that can restore it on another device.[1][3] Who fitted the board, and where, is still unknown. How it worked is clear.[1][3]

Inside, an extra board sat between the main board and the screen.[1] It changed nothing on the wallet itself: not the firmware, its software, and not the Secure Element, its protected chip.[1] It copied the recovery phrase when the screen showed it during backup creation, and when someone typed it in to restore.[1]

It also grabbed any passphrase, an optional extra password, if one appeared on screen.[1] Next, it encrypted the stolen words and sent them out over the mobile network.[1] With no connection, it held on to the data and kept retrying until it succeeded.[1]

The final stop: a server controlled by the attackers.[1] Trezor says its implants work the same way as Ledger's, adapted to the Safe 5's display.[1]

October 28 to November 11: Discovery and Disclosure

October 28, 2026. Trezor's security team gets a responsible disclosure, a private warning so the maker can act first.[3] The sender, the customer in Indonesia, had noticed a difference in his wallet's weight.[2][3] Trezor says a scale proves nothing either way, because small differences can have other causes.[3]

BleepingComputer reported that he opened the device and found the board carried a cellular module and an antenna.[3][7] That same day, Singapore Police warned that Ledgers from some local stores contained malicious hardware. Any CryptoBilis link is unknown.[2] On October 30, Trezor went public. Its own lab had not yet confirmed the implant.[2][3]

Its reasoning: waiting for lab confirmation would leave CryptoBilis buyers exposed in the meantime.[3] At that moment the picture looked calm: the four CryptoBilis devices received so far showed no tampering.[8] Then the count changed. Trezor confirmed one implant in its lab and identified two more from owners' photos.[1]

After the warning, 48 CryptoBilis customers came forward. Trezor has not said how many devices it has checked.[6] So far, implants have turned up only in Safe 5 wallets sold by CryptoBilis, and in no other Trezor model. Devices from other resellers in the region showed no sign of tampering.[1][6] On November 11, Trezor released firmware 2.13.1, which stops the implants found so far from capturing anything.[1][6]

But a fix cannot reach backward: a phrase captured before the update stays captured.[1]

What Owners Should Do

Trezor's advice to anyone who bought from CryptoBilis since March is blunt.[1] Move funds to a new wallet, with a new seed, as soon as possible.[3] Using the old backup on another device does not solve the problem.[3]

An unused CryptoBilis device should not be set up, and should never receive an existing recovery phrase.[3] Without another secure hardware wallet, Trezor suggests temporarily using a software wallet or an exchange you know.[3] Scammers are exploiting the story with fake emails, letters and phone calls. Trezor Support will never ask for your phrase.[3]

A Trezor spokesperson also suggested a multisignature wallet, one that needs approval from more than one device. Use devices from different makers, so one compromised device cannot move funds on its own.[9]

Aftermath

Trezor had already acted after the Ledger reports: as a precaution, it cut its reseller network by about 80%, trustworthy partners included.[1] Dropped resellers were told on October 13: no new stock, and sell what you have until January 1, 2027.[1] Those that remain must follow tighter controls on how devices are sourced, stored and accessed.[6]

Anyone who bought from CryptoBilis since March 2026 can get a new Trezor shipped directly, or a voucher.[3] CryptoBilis suspended sales of all hardware wallet brands in Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia. OneKey cut it off too.[10] Now, the strangest thread. Risky Business News reported that CryptoBilis co-founder Arravind Prabu said he sold the company earlier in the year.[11]

He said a non-disclosure agreement stopped him from revealing the deal.[11] Online reports allege the new owners are an unnamed Chinese company. None of that is confirmed.[11] What role, if any, that sale played, nobody has shown.[3][11]

Autopsy Verdict

Our read starts with one common thread. All three implanted wallets were bought from CryptoBilis.[1][3][6] Trezor now requires its remaining resellers to follow tighter controls on how devices are sourced, stored and accessed. Whether those rules would have stopped this attack is not established, because nobody knows where the tampering happened.[1][6] What is proven: three implanted Trezor wallets, how the implant works, and no loss reports from Trezor buyers so far.[1]

Unverified: the $72 million to $103.4 million Ledger loss range, and the alleged Chinese buyer of CryptoBilis.[4][5][11] The takeaway: an official seller is not a guarantee. Retire any phrase a suspect device has ever shown.[1][3] And the core question is still open: who fitted those boards, and where between the factory and the buyer.[1][3]

What to do

  • Where possible, buy hardware wallets directly from the maker. An authorized listing lowers the risk, but this case shows it does not remove it.
  • Install firmware updates promptly, but treat any phrase that ever touched a suspect device as burned.
  • Never share your recovery phrase, and never type it into a device or website someone sends you to.

Open questions

  • Who fitted the implants into the Trezor Safe 5 devices, and where in the supply chain did it happen?
  • Did any Trezor Safe 5 buyer lose funds? Trezor cannot see balances and has received no loss reports.
  • How many of the 48 CryptoBilis customers' devices has Trezor checked so far, and did any more turn out to be compromised?
  • Were the Trezor and Ledger implants made by the same attackers? Trezor will not compare them while investigations continue.
  • What were the actual total losses from the Ledger implants? Third-party estimates range from $72M to $103.4M and Ledger has not verified any of them.
  • What role, if any, did CryptoBilis's reported undisclosed sale to an allegedly Chinese buyer play?
  • Are the implanted Ledgers found in Europe (MediaMarkt) and at Singapore Airport linked to the CryptoBilis supply chain?
  • Have implants been fitted into Trezor models other than the Safe 5, or into Trezors sold through other resellers? None found so far.

Sources

  1. [1]The Hacker News — Trezor Confirms Hidden Implants in CryptoBilis-Sold Wallets That Can Steal Recovery Phrases
  2. [2]The Hacker News — Trezor Warns of Suspected Hardware Implant in One of Its Wallets Sold by CryptoBilis
  3. [3]Trezor (victim/vendor statement)
  4. [4]Forklog
  5. [5]Cointelegraph — Ledger investigates fund losses linked to Southeast Asian reseller, warns users
  6. [6]BleepingComputer — Trezor confirms crypto-stealing implants in three wallets, releases fix
  7. [7]BleepingComputer — Trezor warns of suspected crypto-theft implant in hardware wallet
  8. [8]Forklog
  9. [9]Cointelegraph — Trezor reduces resellers as a ‘preventative step’ amid Ledger tampering reports
  10. [10]Cointelegraph
  11. [11]Risky Business News — Risky Bulletin: Spyware chip found in Ledger crypto-wallets