Case 020 · Incident: 16 Nov 2026
Optimizely: Why CNN, BBC and Zoom sites ran a hacker's code
On November 16, 2026, an attacker exploited a vulnerability in the Experimentation account signup flow at Optimizely, a website experimentation platform. The attacker used it to add malicious JavaScript to customer projects, so the official Optimizely scripts loaded on the sites of at least 178 organizations, including CNN, the BBC, Zoom, Salesforce and GitLab, served malware to visitors. The payload swapped cryptocurrency wallet addresses, skimmed payment card data entered into site forms, collected cookies and screenshots, and delivered the Coruna and DarkSword iOS exploit kits to iPhones and iPads, though no successful device compromise has been shown.
Trusted Scripts Turn
On November 16, 2026, tampered Optimizely scripts on the sites of CNN, the BBC and Zoom carried a hidden loader. Later that day, the attacker added a card skimmer built to capture card numbers submitted through site forms.[1] The same injected code rewrote cryptocurrency wallet addresses and pushed exploit kits at iPhones and iPads.[1] At least 178 organizations loaded the tampered scripts. Those sites were not necessarily compromised themselves. The poisoned code came straight from Optimizely's own content delivery network.[1][2]
That is the unsettling part. The poison came through scripts that every one of those sites already trusted.[1][3]
Who was hit, and how badly?
Security researcher Scott Helme first spotted it, after his team checked 1,611 Optimizely scripts and found 188 infected files.[2] The victims spanned news, banking, retail and travel. Infected snippets belonged to CNN, the BBC, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Air France-KLM and Peacock, among others.[1] The list also held crypto and trading firms, among them the hardware wallet maker Ledger, OANDA, Coinpass, IG and Interactive Investor.[4]
BleepingComputer checked independently. Using public website scans, it confirmed the malicious script loaded, or tried to load, on Zoom, KLM and GitLab, among others. The outlet also reported Fox News and UNICEF USA among the affected sites.[2] Optimizely's own homepage and login page carried the code too. Researchers named the campaign OPTIMJACK.[1] Report URI, the security firm behind that count, warned the true number is probably higher. It could only check the snippets it found in time.[1]
How did they get in?
So how did one attacker reach projects at so many unrelated companies? Optimizely blamed its own signup flow.[2] In a statement to BleepingComputer, the company said an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in its Experimentation account signup flow.[1][2] How they got that access is still unexplained. What is known: the attacker wrote a loader into the Project JavaScript field of customer projects. A loader is a small piece of code whose only job is to fetch and run more code. The rest of each snippet was left untouched.[1][2]
The tampered snippets still came from cdn.optimizely.com, carrying Optimizely's own certificate, so every page that loaded one ran the loader.[1] Sites that served the snippet from their own domain were hit too, because the content came from the same project.[1] The loader then fetched a second script, track.js, from an attacker-controlled domain.[2]
It shipped in evasive versions: one hid the payload address in base64, another embedded a full copy to survive domain blocks.[1]
What the payload did
The first injection appeared at 04:21 UTC, inside the BBC's snippet.[1] At 13:43 UTC a card skimmer went live, grabbing card number, expiry date and CVV from site forms.[1] It could not read cards typed into cross-origin payment windows, like Stripe's or Adyen's hosted fields.[1]
The crypto swapper rewrote wallet addresses in page text, forms, links, the clipboard and outgoing requests.[1] It only touched addresses that passed a checksum and sat near words like wallet, deposit or send.[1] After each swap, it sent the visitor's cookies and a page screenshot to the attacker, but could not read HttpOnly cookies.[1]
Against iPhones and iPads it served two exploit kits, Coruna and DarkSword, both documented by Google researchers.[1] On the newest iOS 26, a separate chain so far only gathered details about the device.[1] For one window that afternoon, targeted pages reloaded every 60 seconds to retry the exploit, something an alert user might notice.[1]
A trail with no name
The very first injection loaded a domain called webshell.lol, which Report URI ties to the same actor's injector.[1] That injector had surfaced before. It first appeared on Turkish sites on September 17, and later turned up in scripts from Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and Minute Media. SecurityWeek dates the earliest of those sightings to November 13, though that date is unconfirmed.[1][3] Exactly how it reached those earlier scripts is still unclear.[3]
Cynet's endpoint tools had flagged browsers calling the attacker's server, then traced the loader back to Optimizely's CDN.[1] Smartsheet's script was cleaned, then re-infected with a hidden version, a sign the attacker still had access.[1] A mass cleanup began around 20:40 UTC; by 21:52 UTC only TalkTalk's snippet still carried the code.[1]
Ledger's snippet was cleaned at about 20:41 UTC, around the time the mass cleanup began.[1][4] Optimizely told BleepingComputer it blocked access to the vulnerable path and deployed a fix.[2] It removed the injected code, ended sessions, revoked tokens, reset affected accounts and blocked delivery through Cloudflare.[2]
Optimizely added that it had notified all affected customers, and that it would post updates on its status page.[2] This was not Optimizely's first scare; in February it disclosed a separate breach through voice phishing.[3]
What still is not known?
Even with the code pulled, the hardest questions stay open.[1] Optimizely's notice never explained how the flaw worked, how many projects changed, or whether the attacker still has access.[1] Report URI admitted it did not know how one actor gained write access to so many unrelated projects.[1]
Nobody has said how long the vulnerability existed, or how many visitors were exposed.[2] Report URI counted about $7,040 flowing to the attacker's wallets within roughly nine hours.[1] But the estimates clash. StepSecurity put the total across the same addresses near $6,600. Galaxy Digital, in an unconfirmed estimate, put what victims sent at only about $2,300.[1][4]
Thorn suggested, without confirmation, that most of the Bitcoin receipts were the attacker's own funds, routed back through an exchange. StepSecurity, for its part, noted that two of the wallets were already in use before the injections began.[1][4] Helme could not say how many card numbers or cookies actually reached the attacker's server.[4] On the iOS kits, Cynet called what it saw conditional delivery, and Hudson Rock found no proof of a real hack.[1][3]
Some affected firms responded. Salesforce disabled Optimizely scripts as a precaution and said it is still investigating. OANDA, speaking for Coinpass and TMS Brokers, said its internal systems were not breached.[2][4] Report URI kept every infected snippet, with hashes and timestamps, to hand to affected organizations and response teams.[1]
Autopsy Verdict
Our verdict: one vendor's script turned into a weapon on the sites of at least 178 organizations, and the way in is still unexplained.[1][2] For site owners, the lesson is about structure. Lock down where scripts may send data, and keep card entry inside the payment provider's own fields.[1] Proven: a skimmer and a swapper rode real Optimizely scripts. Disputed: the crypto haul. Unproven: any device actually hacked.[1][3][4]
Scott Helme put the lesson plainly: trusted code does not stay trustworthy.[3] And the person behind it still has no name, only two domains and a trail reaching back to September.[1]
What to do
- If you run a site like these, audit who and what can write to your account, and rotate every credential.
- A strict content security policy helps, but allowlisting a compromised vendor's own CDN does not.
- If you visited an affected site, update your Apple devices and recheck any crypto address you paid that day.
- Treat any secret stored in a cookie without the HttpOnly flag as exposed, and rotate it.
- And resist blunt fixes: broadly blocking a legitimate CDN or news site mostly hurts ordinary users.
Open questions
- How exactly did the signup-flow vulnerability give the attacker write access to unrelated customer projects? Optimizely's notice doesn't explain the mechanism, and Cointelegraph says researchers have yet to establish how access was obtained.
- How many customer projects were changed in total? Optimizely hasn't said how many customers were affected, and Report URI says the true number is likely higher than 188 snippets and 178 organizations.
- When did the fix go in, and does the attacker still have any access? Smartsheet's re-infection after cleanup suggests ongoing access at that point.
- How long was the vulnerability present, and how many visitors were exposed?
- How many payment card numbers and cookies actually reached the attacker's server?
- How much crypto was actually stolen from victims? Estimates range from about $2,300 (Galaxy Digital) to about $6,600 (StepSecurity) and about $7,040 (Report URI), and some wallets were active before the attack.
- Were any iPhones or iPads actually compromised by the Coruna or DarkSword exploit kits? Cynet and Hudson Rock say successful exploitation hasn't been shown.
- How did the loader get into the Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and Minute Media scripts, and how does that link to the earlier Turkish-site activity from September 17?
- Who is the attacker? No threat actor has been named beyond infrastructure links (1688360[.]cc, webshell[.]lol).
Sources
- [1]The Hacker News — Hijacked Optimizely Scripts Served Card Skimmer and iOS Exploit Kits to CNN, BBC and Zoom Visitors
- [2]BleepingComputer — Optimizely supply chain attack infects major brands' sites with malware
- [3]SecurityWeek — Optimizely Vulnerability Exploited to Serve Malware on Major Websites
- [4]Cointelegraph — Hackers inject credit card, crypto-stealing malware into 178 major websites