Case 016 · Incident: 27 Aug–3 Sep 2026
APT29: Haven't updated your phone? One website visit was enough
French security firm Sekoia found a watering-hole campaign it calls "Poisoned Source" in mid-October 2026 and published its research on November 4, 2026. It attributes the campaign with moderate-to-high confidence to APT29 (Midnight Blizzard), the group linked to Russia's foreign intelligence service (SVR). The attackers reached iOS and Android users in three ways: by injecting JavaScript into real websites, by running lookalike proxy domains that copied America250 and the Raffles London at The OWO hotel, and by compromising the Ukrainian analytics tracker Plerdy between August 27 and September 3, 2026.
A website that robbed phones
In some cases, the victim did not have to tap or download anything. Visiting a website could be enough for passwords, messages and emails to be stolen from the phone. And every flaw the attackers used had already been patched before the campaign began.[1] It started with a single website. Researchers found malicious code on the site of an unnamed Ukrainian gas production company.[1] This was a watering hole. Instead of chasing targets, you poison a site they already trust and wait for them to arrive. The trap reached both iPhones and Android phones through three separate routes.[2]
Behind it, according to the French security firm Sekoia, is APT29, also called Midnight Blizzard. It is a group believed to be backed by Russia's foreign intelligence service.[3][4][5] Sekoia bases the attribution on three clues. First, traces of a 2025 APT29 operation on one of the hacked sites. Second, similarities to a 2024 APT29 campaign against Mongolian government sites. Third, a victim list centered on Ukraine.[2] Some things Sekoia has not pinned down. It did not establish how many phones were successfully compromised, or how much data the attackers got.[1]
Stage one: the poisoned door
So, stage by stage. The first link was initial access, and the attackers built three of them. All abused places people already trusted.[2] The first route was direct injection. Malicious JavaScript, code that runs in the visitor's browser, went onto real websites: a Ukrainian gas producer, a United States chemical industry trade association, a Bulgarian military-related site and a far-right European political party. Infosecurity Magazine also lists Ukrainian military sites and a Czech far-right movement, without saying whether that movement is the same party.[3][4][6] The second route was imitation. The attackers registered a lookalike of America250 and ran it as a reverse proxy to the genuine site. Visitors saw the real content, with malicious JavaScript quietly added.[7]
Sekoia thinks, unconfirmed, that the celebration-themed site was chosen as bait for later spear-phishing.[7] A second clone copied the Raffles London at The OWO, a luxury hotel near some of the United Kingdom's most sensitive government institutions. Sekoia suspects it was aimed at diplomatic delegations and high-profile guests.[4][7] Ukraine's president reportedly stayed at that Raffles during an October visit. Researchers found no evidence that he was targeted.[1]
The third route was a supply-chain hit. The attackers compromised the Ukrainian analytics service Plerdy and altered its tracker, loaded by thousands of mostly Ukrainian sites, between August 27 and September 3.[5][6] One poisoned script reached a long way, though the sources count it differently. BleepingComputer says thousands of websites load the Plerdy tracker. SecurityWeek counts hundreds exposed to the exploit kit during that one week, including army, special forces, and ballistic and drone equipment sites.[4][6] Not every target made strategic sense. One was an Australian medical clinic. Sekoia believes, with low confidence, such sites may have been used to go after specific individuals.[2]
Stage two: measuring the phone
Stage two was reconnaissance. Before any exploit, the injected code fingerprinted each visitor, harvesting browser and device configuration and sending it out as JSON.[4] That profile went to the command-and-control server, the machine the attackers used to run the operation. Based on what it saw, the server pushed the matching exploit chain to the phone.[6] Then came a strange filter. On Android, the chain checked the phone's model identifier. If it matched a Samsung Galaxy S25 Ultra, the attack stopped. The sources give no reason.[5]
It targeted Chrome versions 139 through 145, but deliberately skipped version 143. Why, nobody knows.[5] Those filters feed an open question. It is unclear whether the attackers wanted visitors of specific sites, or simply as many unpatched phones as they could grab and sort out later.[5]
Stage three: the exploit chains
Stage three was the break-in. Every chain used flaws Apple and Google had already fixed. One chain hit iPhones on iOS 16.7, combining two vulnerabilities to drop cookie-stealing JavaScript.[1][5] One of those flaws defeated Apple's Pointer Authentication Codes, a protection meant to stop hijacked code from running, so the attackers could steal cookies from outside Safari.[4] A second iPhone chain, aimed at iOS 18.5, strung together five vulnerabilities. It relied entirely on an exploit kit called DarkSword for initial access, code execution and privilege escalation.[4][6]
The Android chain paired two flaws that had already been fixed. One was a Chrome vulnerability, patched in March as a zero-day. The other was a Qualcomm bug, patched with Android's August 2025 security update.[4] DarkSword is not APT29's alone. First documented in March, it has been used since at least November 2025 by multiple groups, in operations against users in Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Malaysia.[1][6] Where did APT29 get these exploits? Sekoia's analysis points to a third party, but that is unconfirmed, and no supplier is named.[3]
And this is the link where everything could have failed. Sekoia says a user running an up-to-date operating system was safe from these attacks.[3]
Stage four: the objective
Stage four was theft. On Android, the payload named AndroSnitch collected Chrome cookies, login data, browsing history and saved Wi-Fi passwords.[6] The heavy iPhone payload went further, built to harvest the whole device: messages, emails, voicemails, credentials, contacts, calls, photos, iCloud Drive, and the WhatsApp and Telegram databases.[4][6] Even plain stolen cookies are dangerous. They let attackers reuse logged-in sessions and walk into services such as webmail without ever needing a password.[2]
All three chains sent what they stole to the same place. One endpoint, on one domain: ad dot starx dash net dot com.[5] And then it vanished. None of the payloads persisted, so a reboot stopped the activity, until the phone visited a poisoned site again.[6] This campaign was also greedier than its predecessor. Where a 2024 APT29 operation on Mongolian sites took cookies only for specific websites, this one collected every cookie in the browser.[3]
On November 4, the United States agency CISA added one of the iPhone flaws to its known-exploited list, citing active exploitation, without naming an actor or linking it to Sekoia. Federal agencies had until November 18 to patch.[2] Sekoia says it is working with national CERTs, including Ukraine's CERT-UA, to identify victims and find ways to disrupt the watering-hole infrastructure.[2]
Autopsy Verdict
Our read: the decisive link was the exploit stage, and patching would have broken it.[1][3] The real craft was one link earlier: fingerprint first, exploit second, so each phone got the chain that matched it.[4][6] What is proven: real websites and the Plerdy tracker were poisoned. How the attackers first broke into Plerdy and the hijacked websites has not been disclosed. And the link to APT29 is Sekoia's moderate-to-high-confidence assessment, not a certainty.[3][6]
Still unknown: how many phones fell, how much data left, and who supplied the exploits, plus two unexplained device filters. The spear-phishing and hotel theories are Sekoia's own, and unconfirmed.[1][3][4][5][7] Help Net Security adds earlier context. It notes that over the summer, Microsoft reported this group had spent months hijacking hotel and conference center Wi-Fi networks to steal Microsoft 365 credentials. That report describes earlier activity, not this campaign.[2] Sekoia expects state-backed groups to reuse exploits from commercial surveillance vendors, companies that sell spying tools, more and more often. Patching would have stopped this campaign, but the next flaw may not have a fix yet.[3][4]
What to do
- The control that breaks this link sits with site owners. Monitor every third-party script and analytics tracker you load, pin them with integrity checks, and alert on any code you did not change.
- Turn on automatic updates for your phone's system and for your browser, and install security patches as soon as they arrive. Retire phones too old to receive them. If you are high-risk, such as a diplomat, an official or military staff, turn on Lockdown Mode on your iPhone.
- Keep every device updated, and replace the ones that no longer get security patches. Restart your phone regularly; it is a cheap habit that clears malicious code that cannot survive a reboot. If you think an account was exposed, sign out of all active sessions, revoke remembered logins, and change your passwords, including saved Wi-Fi passwords.
Open questions
- How many devices were actually compromised, and how much data was stolen? Sekoia did not establish this.
- Did the attackers target visitors of specific sites, or compromise as many unpatched phones as possible and sort the data later?
- Why did the Android chain skip Chrome version 143? The reason is unknown.
- Why did the Android chain stop on the Samsung Galaxy S25 Ultra (SM-S938B)? The sources give no reason.
- The sources don't say how the attackers first broke into Plerdy or the legitimate websites.
- Where did APT29 get the exploits? Sekoia's analysis points to a third party, but the supplier is not named.
- Was anyone targeted through the hotel clone? Researchers found no evidence that Zelensky was.
- What were the low-strategic-value sites, such as an Australian medical clinic, used for? Sekoia's view that they targeted specific individuals is low-confidence.
- CISA's KEV listing for CVE-2024-27834 was not tied to this campaign or to any named actor.
Sources
- [1]The Record — Russian state-linked hackers target iPhone, Android devices in zero-click espionage campaign
- [2]Help Net Security
- [3]Infosecurity Magazine
- [4]SecurityWeek — Russia-Linked Hackers Hit iOS, Android Devices With Exploit Chains via Watering Holes
- [5]The Hacker News — APT29-Linked Hackers Hijack Web Analytics Script to Deliver iOS and Android Exploits
- [6]BleepingComputer — Hackers use n-day exploits in zero-click attacks on iOS, Android devices
- [7]Ars Technica — Hackers exploited iOS and Android flaws to infect phones